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employment relationship in Britain and Germany form a comparative perspective. 
The first section briefly introduces governance systems for the employment relation-
ship in both countries and then outlines recent trends. The second section summarises 
quantitative studies on establishment-level determinants of governance structures. The 
third section contrasts and discusses the experiences of Britain and Germany and 
speculates about the future of collective bargaining in both countries.  
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1.  Introduction 
The „essence of an effective employment relationship is one in which the parties both 
successfully resolve issues arising from their conflicting interests and successfully pur-
sue joint gains in cases where they share common interests“ (Kochan/Katz 1988: 7). 
Transaction-cost theory argues that the optimal co-ordination of economic transac-
tions requires both contractual incentives to ensure efficient behaviour by the parties 
and also regulatory organisations and institutions (Baron/Kreps 1999: 91). Efficiency 
thus becomes a question of institutional design and governance structure. Williamson 
(1996: 11) defines governance „as an institutional framework in which the integrity of 
a transaction, or related set of transactions, is decided.“  
One may distinguish three basic types of governance mechanism and respective 
governance structures for the employment relationship: individual governance by in-
dividual agreement between employer and employee; collective governance by collec-
tive agreement between employers and representational bodies of the employees; and 
statutory governance by state regulation. Over time, governance structures may 
emerge, change their shape, or disappear.  
This article analyses and discusses the development of governance structures for 
the employment relationship in Britain and Germany form a comparative perspective. 
The first section briefly introduces governance systems for the employment relation-
ship in both countries and then outlines recent trends. The second section summarises 
quantitative studies on establishment-level determinants of governance structures. The 
third section contrasts and discusses the experiences of Britain and Germany and 
speculates about the future of collective bargaining in both countries.  
2.  The decentralisation and decollectivisation of governance structures 
in Britain and Germany 
Britain 
British industrial relations have been characterised by the tradition of voluntarism 
(Flanders 1974). This tradition includes the preferences of the industrial relations ac-
tors—the employers, the unions, and the state—for voluntary procedural and substan-
tive regulation of the employment relationship and also for a non-legalistic approach 
to collective bargaining (Edwards et al. 1992: 21; Gospel/Palmer 1993: 155). 
The first signs of decentralisation in the British governance system, then domi-
nated by national multi-employer collective bargaining, had already appeared in the 
immediate post-war period, when industry-level agreements became less important 
with the rise of local and shop-floor bargaining (Department of Employment 1971). 
This type of bargaining evolved from the government-initiated establishment of joint 
production, consultative and advisory committees in the factories during the Second 
World War (Lerner 1964: 5f.). The termination of most committees after 1945 left a 
legacy of shop stewards (Phelps Brown 1986: 148), who gained in strength with the 
increase in labour demand and labour shortages, and could raise wages above nation-
ally-agreed rates (Booth 1995: 24) independently of the control of employers, unions 
and governments alike. 
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Related to the issue of shop-floor bargaining is the growing importance of pro-
ductivity bargaining, something that several reports by institutions associated with in-
comes policies had explicitly recommended during the 1960s (Mitchell 1972: 152; 
Clegg 1972: 305ff.). In productivity bargaining, pay increases are conceded in ex-
change for union commitments to changes in working practices which are expected to 
increase labour productivity (Terry/Dickens 1991). In a number of cases, productivity 
bargaining led to the withdrawal of companies from the employers' association when 
the association insisted that the national agreement be applied (Department of Em-
ployment 1971: 2). 
Deteriorating economic performance, inflationary wage settlements, and the 
growing importance of shop-stewards, stimulated debate about the most appropriate 
levels of collective bargaining. In 1968 the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' associations (known as the Donovan Commission) reported that work-
place bargaining was more important than anyone had realised. The Donovan Com-
mission recommended the formalisation of plant-level industrial relations—that is, 
management should grant recognition and official status to shop stewards, and with 
them develop written plant-level collective agreements to supplement the multi-
employer agreements (Royal Commission 1968).  
Between the Donovan Commission and the coming into power of the Conserva-
tive government in 1979, two divergent but related trends had a lasting impact on 
governance structures in Britain. Within the framework of national incomes policies, 
the government unsuccessfully attempted to formalise collective bargaining and to 
control wage-bargaining by several means such as the 1971 Industrial Relations Act 
and the social contract recommendations. Even so, local industrial relations flour-
ished. Company or workplace bargaining was increasingly considered not only as a 
supplement but also as an alternative to national level bargaining. The significance of 
multi-employer collective bargaining continued to decline, although formal coverage 
rates remained quite high.  
Whereas all previous post-war governments took a positive stance towards (cen-
tralised) collective bargaining, the return to power of the Conservative Party in 1979 
heralded a significant change in government attitudes towards collective bargaining. 
Collective organisations and institutions such as unions and collective bargaining were 
now believed to prevent the labour market from functioning by exerting monopoly 
power (Deakin/Morris 1998: 41). And so, instead of continuing to pursue the path of 
collective laissez-faire, state corporatism, and Keynesian economic policy, the Conser-
vative government adopted a radical programme of deregulation, privatisation, and 
monetarist economic policy. The Thatcher government maintained an especially hos-
tile stance towards national agreements, and explicitly criticised them for establishing 
rigid national wage-rates that restricted downward flexibility of wages and thus con-
tributed to unemployment (Department of Employment 1988, cited in Brown/Zappala 
1993: 61). 
Reform of industrial relations was a central part of the Conservative programme. 
New legislation limited the right to strike, reduced union rights, and subjected the un-
ions to an unprecedented degree of external regulation and supervision. The rights of 
individual union members were strengthened and the closed shop abolished. In the 
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early 1980s the repeal of the 1946 Fair Wages Legislation, which provided for the sec-
toral extension of multi-employer agreements to non-union firms, removed the floor 
of wages for non-union firms. The ending of the statutory system of industrial training 
boards in most sectors in 1982, and the abolition of the Wages Councils in 1993, fur-
ther undermined national bargaining (Brown et al. 1997; Deakin/Morris 1998: 39ff.). 
Thus, the period between 1979 and 1997 saw a significant reorganisation of gov-
ernance structures in Britain. Analysis of the four cross-sectional waves of the Work-
place Industrial/Employment Relations (WIRS/WERS) surveys permits estimation of 
coverage rates of different governance structures for British establishments with 25 or 
more employees for the period 1980 to 1998 (Table 1).  
Table 1: Coverage rates of governance structures in Britain, 1980-1998  
(Source: Zagelmeyer 2004) 
in % of establishments with 25 or more employees 1980 1984 1990 1998 
No collective bargaining 33 34 47 68 
Single-employer collective bargaining 20 20 21 15 
Multi-employer collective bargaining 47 47 32 18 
 
Between 1980 and 1998, the sector with individual regulation (or ‘no collective bar-
gaining’) grew from 33% to 68% of all establishments with 25 or more employees. 
While single-employer collective bargaining covered about 20% of those establish-
ments between 1980 and 1990, it had declined to 15% in 1998. Multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining stood at about 47% of those establishments in 1980 and 1984, and 
then declined to 38% in 1990 and 18% in 1998. During the second half of the 1980s, 
the multi-employer arrangements were terminated on a large scale in a number of in-
dustries, most significantly in engineering and shipbuilding (Industrial Relations Ser-
vices 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b). A considerable number of 
companies, especially large ones, withdrew from multi-employer arrangements, which 
in some cases led to the collapse of the employers' association and/or the termination 
of the national agreement (Purcell/Ahlstrand 1994: 125). As a consequence, many 
employers' associations introduced a new membership status, which provided that 
members were not automatically bound by collective agreement (EIRR 1994; Indus-
trial Relations Services 1994a, 1994b).  
After almost two decades of Conservative rule, the Labour Party was re-elected 
to office in 1997. New Labour introduced a national minimum wage law in 1998, 
signed up for the European Community Agreement on Social Policy, and strength-
ened employment protection and active labour market policy (Edwards et al. 1997). 
The most recent development, which might have a profound effect on collective bar-
gaining structure, is the passing of the Employment Relations Act of 1999, which 
came into effect on 6 June 2000 and provides the following recognition procedure. 
Assuming that its two preconditions are met—namely, that the union organises 10% 
of the workforce within the proposed bargaining unit, and that a majority of workers 
in the proposed unit are likely to favour recognition—then, where a union recognition 
claim cannot be resolved bilaterally with the employer concerned, the union may refer 
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the matter to the tripartite Central Arbitration Committee (CAC). The CAC deter-
mines the scope of the bargaining unit and declares whether the union should be rec-
ognised (Hall 2000).  
It will be interesting to see how the most recent developments in British indus-
trial relations will affect the development of governance structures. Brook (2002: 344) 
reports that the trend of continuing membership decline, which started in 1980, ap-
peared to have stopped in 1997 and has since been slightly reversed, but with union 
density still declining. With regard to governance structures, one may expect that the 
introduction of the new recognition procedures will strengthen unions in the work-
place and also strengthen collective bargaining as an institution, as early research based 
on case studies has reported (Oxenbridge et al. 2001).  
Germany 
Central to the German collective bargaining system is the concept of the Tarifautonomie 
(collective bargaining autonomy), which describes the legal right of coalitions of em-
ployers and employees to regulate the terms and conditions of employment within the 
framework of labour law, independently of any influences of the state. Collective bar-
gaining takes place mainly at regional level, by industry. In certain industries, however, 
collective bargaining is also quite frequent at national or company level. Formally, only 
the signatories and their members are legally bound by the collective agreement, al-
though employers usually apply the contracts to all employees. Apart from collective 
bargaining, other mechanisms and levels exist where wages and employment condi-
tions are bargained over; for example, workplace bargaining between works council 
and management. In general, it is unlawful for works agreements to contain provisions 
which are regulated by collective agreement. However, a collective agreement can ex-
pressly permit the conclusion of works agreements to supplement it.  
The first signs pointing towards decentralisation of collective bargaining occurred 
in the second half of the 1960s, with the integration of the unions into incomes poli-
cies in order to fight a deteriorating economic situation. This led to discontent among 
the rank-and-file union members over the ‘moderate wage’ policy, the excessive cen-
tralisation of the unions' policy, and union involvement in the concerted action ar-
rangement at national level. Subsequently, the rank-and-file demanded decentralised 
bargaining. At the same time, protection-against-rationalisation-agreements (Rationalis-
ierungsschutz-Abkommen) occurred in various industries, including provisions for retrain-
ing, extended periods of notice, financial compensation in the event of job loss, or 
phased compensatory payments in the event of downgrading to lower pay grades.  
The early 1970s then saw the emergence of qualitative bargaining policy (Qualita-
tive Tarifpolitik), which aimed to improve working life and to protect employees against 
the adverse effects of rationalisation and technological change. The metal sector 
framework wage agreement included, among other things, provision for the estab-
lishment of performance requirements, work organisation, and rest periods. That 
agreement was an early example of the insertion of an opening clause in collective 
agreements, as it included framework-provisions and minimum standards which were 
to be bargained over at establishment level. To this end, establishment-level bodies 
were given certain co-determination rights (Bispinck 1999: 5; French 2001: 8).  
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The conditions for collective bargaining changed in the early 1980s, when Ger-
many was hit by recession and increasing unemployment, and a liberal-conservative 
coalition took over government in 1983. Subsequently, the focus of the unions' collec-
tive bargaining policy shifted towards collective working time reduction in order to 
‘humanise’ working life and to fight unemployment. In 1984, 1987, and 1990, a series 
of collective agreements in the metal and printing industries reduced weekly working 
hours from 40 to 35, to be implemented by 1995 (Bispinck 1996: 6).  
The agreements to reduce weekly working hours had far-reaching consequences. 
The unions achieved their goal only by permitting a flexibilisation of collectively-
agreed working time, which was to be implemented at local levels. In the metal sector, 
these provisions had to be implemented by works agreements at establishment level, 
implying a delegation of authority from multi-employer collective bargaining to work-
place bargaining between works councils and management (Bispinck 1999: 7). 
In the 1990s, German unification, the subsequent transformation process, and 
the transfer of the western German industrial relations institutions to eastern Ger-
many considerably changed the scene for collective bargaining. A trend which started 
in the mid 1980s but took off in the early 1990s was the conclusion of multi-employer 
agreements, which include so-called ‘opening clauses’ that delegate bargaining author-
ity to lower levels, usually to the individual employer and the works council, in order 
to allow for temporary deviations from the central multi-employer agreement. The 
background to this trend was the companies’ demand for regulations on working con-
ditions to be more company-specific in order to maintain and/or increase competi-
tiveness. That demand was supplemented by a demand from the workforces to in-
crease job and employment security against the background of rising unemployment 
(Bellman et al. 1999). 
In addition, a phenomenon of increasing importance has been the conclusion of 
company-level employment pacts, which have been concluded either as company 
agreements, works agreements, or some more informal agreement between manage-
ment and works council. Typical employment pacts include guarantees of jobs, em-
ployment security, or employment levels (plus, in some cases, a continuing commit-
ment to invest in the production locality) by the company in exchange for 'conces-
sions' by the employees, i.e. unpaid increases in working time, increased working time 
flexibility, wage cuts, or a reduction of payments above contract wages (Zagelmeyer 
2000). 
With respect to eastern Germany, the transfer of the industrial relations and col-
lective bargaining institutions resulted in a number of frictions. Employers' associa-
tions, especially, had and still have difficulties in organising potential members. A ma-
jor challenge to the system was the unions' goal of bringing eastern wages up to west-
ern levels, regardless of productivity. In 1993, the metal-sector employers unilaterally 
terminated the collective agreement on phased adjustment. After two weeks of indus-
trial action the notice was repealed, while the adjustment period was extended and a 
hardship clause was introduced to allow local deviations from the industry agreement 
(Bispinck 1999: 8).  
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Despite the post-unification membership boom in eastern Germany, trade union 
density in union density has since been declining (Hassel 1999: 493f.). As a reaction to 
continued membership losses, a considerable number of employers' associations have 
introduced a new membership status, which provides that under these rules the mem-
ber is not automatically bound by any collective agreement.  
Whereas, for a long time, representative information of collective bargaining cov-
erage in Germany had not been available, the IAB establishment panel (IAB-
Betriebspanel) permits estimation of coverage rates of different governance structures 
for German establishments with 1 or more employees. Table 2 displays coverage rates 
of governance structures in Germany between 1996 and 2001.  
Table 2: Coverage rates of governance structures in Germany, 1996-2001  
(Sources: Kohaut/Schnabel 1999, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Lehmann 2002) 
in % of establishments with 1 or more employees 1996 1998 2000 2001 
 Western Germany 
No collective bargaining 41 47 52 53 
Single-employer collective bargaining 10 5 3 3 
Multi-employer collective bargaining 49 48 45 45 
 Eastern Germany 
No collective bargaining 57 66 73 72 
Single-employer collective bargaining 15 8 4 6 
Multi-employer collective bargaining 28 26 23 22 
 
Between 1996 and 2001, the sector with individual regulation (no collective bargain-
ing) grew from 41% to 53% of all western German establishments with one or more 
employees. During that period, coverage of western German establishments by single-
employer collective bargaining decreased from 10% to 3%. Multi-employer bargaining 
covered 49% of establishments in 1996 and 45% in 2001. 
For eastern Germany, the trend was rather similar. Between 1996 and 2001, the 
sector with individual regulation grew from 57% to 72% of eastern German estab-
lishments, while coverage by single-employer bargaining decreased from 15% to 6%. 
Coverage by multi-employer collective agreements fell from 28% of all establishments 
in 1996 to 22% in 2001. 
3.  Determinants of Governance Structures: Quantitative Analyses  
Against the background of recent developments in Britain and Germany, the follow-
ing question emerges. What factors actually determine these developments?  
Table 3 and Table 4 provide an overview of the existing quantitative studies-
based on the British WIRS/WERS or the German IAB establishment panel-of the es-
tablishment-level determinants of governance structures for Britain and Germany, 
summarizing the type of data, the method of (multivariate) analysis, the definition of 
the dependent variable, and the main results concerning the explanatory variables. Al-
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though there is a considerable variation with regard to the definition of the dependent 
variables, most studies select similar sets of independent variables. The overview is 
confined to research on the three types of governance structure, namely individual 
regulation, single-employer collective bargaining, and multi-employer collective bar-
gaining.  
Research based on the British Workplace Industrial/Employee Relations Survey 
series (Table 3) includes a large number of research studies on the determinants of un-
ion recognition. Studies by Beaumont/Harris (1989, 1991) yield the results that union 
recognition is positively associated with organisation and establishment size, age, the 
percentage of female employees, and the percentage of part-time employees, whereas 
union recognition is negatively associated with the proportion of manual workers. Re-
search by Disney et al. (1995) and Machin (2000) shows that union recognition is posi-
tively associated with establishment size, establishment age, as well public-sector and 
private-sector manufacturing establishments. According to these studies, union recog-
nition is negatively associated with the percentage of part-time employees, foreign 
ownership, and single-establishment companies. Nonetheless, it has to be borne in 
mind that these studies explicitly address the issue of union recognition, and not the 
issue of individual regulation versus collective bargaining. Zagelmeyer (2004) explicitly 
addresses the latter question and shows that the decision between individual regula-
tion and collective bargaining is positively associated with establishment size, organisa-
tion size, and establishment age, and negatively associated foreign ownership.  
There are only two studies of collective bargaining centralisation in Britain. Re-
search by Booth (1989) shows that centralisation is negatively associated with estab-
lishment/organisation size and foreign ownership, and positively associated with the 
share of labour costs in turnover. Zagelmeyer (2004) shows that centralisation is nega-
tively associated with establishment size and positively associated with the percentage 
of skilled employees. As concerns the impact of measures of competition and the 
geographical scope of the product markets, the research to date is inconclusive. 
Research on the determinants of governance structures based on the German 
IAB Establishment Panel is most comprehensive with regard to the alternative choices 
examined and most heterogeneous with regard to explanatory determinants included 
in the models (Table 4). As far as the choice between individual regulation and collec-
tive bargaining is concerned, a study by Bellmann/Kohaut (1997) shows that estab-
lishment size, establishment age, the existence of a works council, and the percentage 
of skilled employees are positively associated with collective bargaining, and that es-
tablishments with a high percentage of exports in turnover are less likely to have col-
lective bargaining. Research on the choice between decentralised regulation and multi-
employer collective bargaining (Bellmann et al. 1999; Kohaut/Schnabel 2001, 2003b; 
Lehmann 2002) shows that establishment size, subsidiary establishment of multi-plant 
firms, and establishment age are positively associated with multi-employer collective 
bargaining.  
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Table 3: Quantitative empirical studies on the determination of governance structures 
(Britain, WIRS/WERS) 
Author(s), Data, 
Method 
Dependent 
variable 
Summary of main significant results concerning explanatory 
variables 
Booth (1989), 680 
private sector  
establishments, 
WIRS84  
(cross-section), 
multinomial logit. 
 
Organisation 
level bargain-
ing (OLB) and 
establishment 
level bargain-
ing (ELB) vs. 
multi-
employer bar-
gaining (base 
category). 
+ OLB: Organisation size of 50,000+ employees, foreign ownership, 
job-evaluation schemes, share ownership or value added bonus 
schemes. 
– OLB: Labour share in costs, member of employers' association, 
trade-union density (50-74%). 
 OLB: Age, payment-by-results, union density (75%-99%, 100%),  
organisation size of 5,000-50,000 employees  
+ ELB: Age of establishment, foreign owned, metal manufacturing. 
– ELB: Labour share in costs, member of employers' association. 
 ELB: Trade-union density, establishment size, share ownership or 
value added bonus schemes. 
Beaumont/Harris 
(1989), 800 private 
sector establish-
ments, WIRS84 
(cross-section),  
logit. 
Union recog-
nition (1) vs. 
non-
recognition 
(0). 
+ Establishment and organisation size, establishment age, percentage 
of manual workers, technology.  
– Percentage of female and part-time employees, joint consultative 
committees. 
 Foreign ownership, profit-sharing. 
Beaumont/Harris 
(1991), 2611 private 
sector establish-
ments, WIRS80, 
WIRS84 (cross-
section), logit. 
Union re-
cognition (1) 
vs. non-
recognition 
(0). 
Results for manual employees: 
+ Establishment and organisation size, establishment age, percentage 
of manual workers.  
– Percentage of female and part-time employees. 
 High technology plant, head office, foreign ownership, shift work,  
financial performance, growth in sales. 
Gregg/Naylor 
(1993), 854 private 
sector establish-
ments, WIRS84 
(cross-section),  
probit. 
Union recog-
nition (1) vs. 
non-
recognition 
(0). 
+ Establishment size, establishment age. 
 
Disney et al. (1995), 
WIRS80, WIRS84, 
WIRS90, (cross-
section, pooled), 
logit. 
Union re-
cognition (1) 
vs. non-
recognition 
(0). 
+ Public sector, private sector manufacturing, establishment size,  
establishment age, percentage of manual workers. 
– Percentage of part-time employees, foreign ownership, single-
establishment companies. 
Machin (2000), all 
WIRS/WERS 
waves (cross-
section, pooled  
data), probit. 
Union recog-
nition (1) vs. 
non-
recognition 
(0). 
+ Public sector, private sector manufacturing, establishment size,  
establishment age. 
– Percentage of part-time employees, foreign ownership, single-
establishment companies. 
Model 1: 
NoCB (0) vs. 
CB (1). 
Summary of selected results (for details, see Zagelmeyer 2004): 
+ Establishment size, organisation size. 
– New establishments, foreign ownership. 
 Competition, percentages of female, part-time, and skilled  
employees, and the existence of shift-working schemes. 
Model 2: 
SECB (0) vs. 
MECB (1). 
+ Percentage of skilled employees. 
– Establishment size. 
Zagelmeyer (2004), 
all WIRS/WERS 
waves, private sec-
tor establishments 
(cross-section, UK, 
pooled data),  
multiple estimation 
techniques. 
Model 3: 
MECB (2) vs. 
SECB (1) vs. 
NoCB (0). 
+ Establishment size, organisation size, percentage of skilled  
employees. 
– Percentage of female employees, percentage of part-time  
employees, establishment, foreign ownership. 
 Shift-working schemes, central representation of personnel  
management on the top governing body. 
Notes:  NoCB = no collective bargaining, CB = collective bargaining, SECB = single-employer collective 
bargaining, DR = decentralised regulation, MECB = multi-employer collective bargaining,  
+ = positive significant association at 10% level, – = negative significant association at 10% level, 
 = no significant association at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Quantitative empirical studies on the determination of governance structures 
(Germany, IAB Establishment Panel) 
Author(s), Data, 
Method 
Dependent 
variable 
Summary of main significant results concerning explanatory 
variables 
Bellmann/Kohaut 
(1997), 2936 estab-
lishments, IAB Es-
tablishment Panel 
(cross-section, 
1995), probit. 
No collec-
tive bargain-
ing (0) vs. 
collective 
bargaining 
(1).  
+ Percentage of female employees, establishment size, works council. 
– Export share in turnover, new establishment. 
 Percentage of skilled employees, turnover, outsourcing,  
reorganisation, technology, earnings. 
Model 1: 
DR (0) vs. 
MECB (1). 
+ Establishment size, subsidiary. 
– Establishment size (sqr.), new establishment, legal status. 
 Percentage of unskilled employees, earnings, turnover, export share 
in turnover. 
Bellmann et al. 
(1999), 2973 
(Model 2: 1232) 
western German 
establishments, 
3140 (Model 2: 
920) eastern Ger-
man establish-
ments, IAB Estab-
lishment Panel 
(cross-section, 
1997), probit. 
Model 2: No 
quit of 
MECB (0) 
vs. quit of 
MECB (1). 
– Establishment size, subsidiary (eastern Germany), wage-gap  
(western Germany). 
 Establishment age, legal status, percentage of unskilled employees, 
earnings, turnover, export share in turnover, employment change, 
payment above collectively agreed wages. 
Kohaut/Schnabel 
(2003a), 8021  
western German 
establishments, 
5301 eastern Ger-
man establish-
ments, IAB Estab-
lishment Panel 
(cross-section, 
2000), ordered pro-
bit (analysis of quits 
1999/2000 not re-
ported here). 
Model 3: 
MECB (4) 
vs. SECB 
(3) vs. 
NoCB and 
orientation 
at CB (2) 
vs. NoCB, 
no orienta-
tion (1). 
+ Establishment size, subsidiary, foreign ownership (eastern  
Germany), percentage of skilled employees. 
– Establishment size (sqr.), new establishment (western Germany), 
legal status, foreign ownership (western Germany). 
 New establishment (eastern Germany). 
 
Model 1: 
DR (0) vs. 
MECB (1). 
+ Establishment size, subsidiary, foreign ownership (eastern  
Germany), percentage of skilled employees. 
– Establishment size (sqr.), new establishment, legal status, foreign 
ownership (western Germany). 
Kohaut/Schnabel 
(2003b), 9255 west-
ern German estab-
lishments, 5480 
eastern German es-
tablish-ments, IAB 
Establishment 
Panel (cross-
section 2001 and 
panel 2000-2001), 
probit (analysis of 
pooled data not re-
ported here) 
Model 2: No 
quit (0) vs. 
quit of 
MECB (1). 
+ Establishment size squared,  
– Establishment size, foreign ownership (western Germany),  
percentage of skilled employees (western Germany), payment  
above collectively agreed wages, works council 
 Subsidiary, new establishment, legal status, foreign ownership 
(eastern Germany), percentage of skilled employees (eastern  
Germany), employment change. 
Model 1: 
DR (0) vs. 
MECB (1). 
Summary of selected results (for details, see Lehmann 2002): 
+ Establishment size, existence of works council, payment above  
collectively agreed wage-rates, shift work, percentage of skilled  
employees. 
– Establishment age, export share in turnover. 
Lehmann (2002), 
7587 establish-
ments (IAB Panel 
1995-2000, cross-
section and panel), 
multiple estimation 
techniques. 
Model 2: No 
quit (0) vs. 
quit of 
MECB (1). 
– Establishment size, works council. 
Notes:  NoCB = no collective bargaining, CB = collective bargaining, SECB = single-employer collective 
bargaining, DR = decentralised regulation, MECB = multi-employer collective bargaining,  
+ = positive significant association at 10% level, – = negative significant association at 10% level, 
 = no significant association at 10% level. 
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All existing quantitative empirical analysis and discussion of the process of decentrali-
sation and decollectivisation of governance structures for the employment relationship 
in Britain and Germany of the type summarised in Tables 3 and 4 faces the problem 
that the interpretation of the results may be highly subjective, while the results of the 
various quantitative studies cannot be really compared, owing to differences in the 
questions, the coding, the construction of the datasets, and the modelling procedures. 
Although there are now a number of studies addressing the issue of the evolution of 
governance structures, the state of our knowledge about causal relationships and the 
mechanisms of change is still unsatisfactory.  
4.  Discussion  
As employment relations strategies, decollectivisation and decentralisation constitute 
processes that may arise out of complex combinations of micro-and macro-level de-
terminants. A number of studies are available on the determinants of governance 
structures but most of them, especially those based on cross-sectional data, are charac-
terised by difficulty in explaining changes in governance structures. The following sec-
tion summarises the arguments as to why collective and governance structures may 
have deteriorated in Britain and Germany, with a specific emphasis on those argu-
ments which are difficult to analyse in quantitative studies. It concludes with a specu-
lative discussion of the future of collective bargaining in both countries.  
Determinants of decentralisation and decollectivisation 
As far as the determinants of change are concerned, labour law and government pol-
icy are paramount. In Britain, the years of the Conservative government reinforced 
and boosted the trends of decentralisation and decollectivisation that already started 
before 1979. Legislation weakened union power and organisation. The Conservative 
rhetoric against multi-employer collective bargaining as well as the abolition of indus-
trial training boards and the fair wages legislation, both of which provided incentives 
for employer cooperation, gave the death-blow to multi-employer bargaining in the 
private sector. In addition, the government abandoned corporatist incomes policies 
and advocated the value of a free-market economy. The recasting of labour law cre-
ated a positive climate for new ways of managing employment relations, in which em-
ployers demanded a return of prerogatives and control from the unions.  
In Germany, the picture is quite different. There were only limited attempts by 
the CDU-led government to initiate labour market deregulation, which employers in-
terpreted as support for increasing labour market flexibility (French, 2001). In contrast 
to the UK after 1979, the value of industry-level agreements in Germany has never 
been seriously questioned, whether by the conservative Christian-Democratic Party 
(CDU) or by the labour-oriented Social-Democratic Party (SPD). 
Changes in labour law and public policy are directly related to the second impor-
tant factor, the decline of trade unionism. In Britain, most significant in this respect is 
the increasing number of establishments without union members and without union 
recognition. More recent workplaces, especially, are less likely to be subject to collec-
tive bargaining. One may surmise that, in the absence of union members from the 
company, only very few employers would establish any form of collective bargaining. 
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Rather, they would attempt to devise institutions that yield the potential benefits of a 
collective voice without having to bear the costs of monopoly unionism. Such institu-
tions could be joint consultative committees, works councils, or other collective bod-
ies representing the workforce. This argument may also apply to Germany although, 
unfortunately, quantitative evidence of falling levels of unionisation in the workplace 
is unavailable. 
Third, collective bargaining and multi-employer bargaining may be institutions 
that have simply passed their zenith and are no longer consistent with today's business 
challenges. Institutions may become both ineffective and inefficient over time. A cer-
tain governance structure may have delivered certain net benefits to the industrial rela-
tions actors in earlier decades but may not pass the cost-benefit analysis any longer. 
Research on governance structures in Britain shows that, unlike single-employer bar-
gaining, multi-employer bargaining neither yielded any wage moderation nor reduced 
the likelihood of industrial action (Zagelmeyer 2004). It would be interesting to see 
comparable research on governance structures in Germany. 
Fourth, a number of organisational and management-related changes have taken 
place since the early 1980s, and some of these may be related to the decline of collec-
tive governance. As the empirical evidence suggests that establishment and organisa-
tion size are both positively associated with collective bargaining, one may argue that 
lean production (with its negative effect on establishment and organisation size) may 
have contributed to the decline of collective institutions, both in Germany and Britain.  
Fifth, sectoral change appears to be an important factor. Service-sector estab-
lishments are less likely to participate in either collective bargaining or centralised col-
lective bargaining. An explanation for this may be the reduced likelihood of service-
sector employees being union members and/or a reduced demand by employers for 
collective governance as service-sector employment relationships inhibit a greater de-
gree of flexibility. 
Sixth, any analysis of collective bargaining centralisation and multi-employer col-
lective bargaining should look at the development of employers' associations. One 
may argue that the demise of private-sector, multi-employer collective bargaining in 
Britain is closely associated with the decline of employers' associations during the 
1980s. Although comparable nationally representative figures for German employers' 
associations are unavailable, there is some indication that the organisational density of 
employers associations in western Germany, at least in the metal sector, are declining, 
whereas in eastern Germany the employers' associations have had serious organisa-
tional problems ever since unification and the beginning of institutional transfer.  
Finally, a further potential factor contributing to the decline of collective govern-
ance structures may be international economic integration. It is often assumed that mul-
tinational companies and companies with international markets take part in multi-firm 
arrangements less commonly because they develop their own organisation-based em-
ployment systems. However, recent research on the situation in Britain (Zagelmeyer 
2004) shows that there is only weak evidence that establishments under foreign-control 
and/or with international product markets are negatively associated with collective bar-
gaining or collective bargaining centralisation. For Germany, the most recent research 
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using data from the year 2001 shows that foreign ownership of companies is negatively 
associated with collective bargaining centralisation in western Germany, while there is a 
positive association for eastern Germany (Kohaut/Schnabel 2003b). 
Collective governance in Britain and Germany: Past and future  
Quantitative studies on the micro-determinants of governance structures in Britain 
and Germany yield, by and large, similar results. In addition, if one seeks to compare 
developments at industry level in, for example, the metal and engineering sector, ele-
ments of the process of decentralisation appear stunningly comparable (for details, see 
McKinlay/McNulty 1991; French 2001), although developments have taken place 
with a time lag of about a decade. Beginning with the increase in local bargaining ac-
tivities, and continuing with the transfer of bargaining authority from multi-employer 
to single-employer levels, these processes also include the change of policies and ser-
vices offered by employers' associations. Nonetheless, whereas multi-employer ar-
rangements collapsed in the British metal sector at the end of the 1980s, the German 
metal sector is still in the process of organised decentralisation. 
Two questions emerge. Why has the German governance system not decentral-
ised or decollectivised more rapidly? And will it follow the same path as the British 
system?  
In order to find answers to these questions, it seems useful to introduce two dif-
ferent analytical concepts of embeddedness. Institutional embeddedness refers to the 
institutional, i.e. legal, environment of collective bargaining, and is also closely associ-
ated with public policy. In contrast, organisational embeddedness refers to the organ-
isational environment of collective bargaining—that is to say, the structure, strategy, 
and strength of trade unions and employers' associations. And with regard to these 
two types of embeddedness, Britain and Germany differ quite considerably.  
As far as institutional embeddedness is concerned, the solid legal framework for 
collective bargaining and co-determination in Germany contributes to the effective-
ness of collective governance. In contrast, the British tradition of non-legalism allows 
for faster changes in governance structures, the industrial-relations actors permitting. 
Institutional complementarities in the German system of industrial relations, e.g. be-
tween the apprenticeship system, corporatist policy-making, and central coordination 
of industry bargaining, create incentives for companies to remain with the employers' 
association in order to have a say in policy-making. Finally, in contrast to Britain, 
workplace collective bargaining is conducted by the works councils rather than by 
shop stewards. The fact that works councils enjoy legal status provides them with in-
stitutional security and makes them less dependent on rank-and-file support.  
Although the decentralisation of collective bargaining began much earlier in Brit-
ain, the year 1979 marked a sea-change in government attitudes towards trade unions 
and collective bargaining, with significant changes in legislation and public policy. In 
contrast, political support for collective institutions did not cease in Germany during 
the period of conservative rule from 1983 to 1998. Hassel (2002: 315) identifies the 
continuing political support, institutionally backed by, among others, the current tri-
partite employment pact, and the penetration of trade unionists in all political parties, 
as the „single most important stabilizing factor in the German industrial relations sys-
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tem“. In Germany, centralised collective bargaining still enjoys legislative support in 
form of the option of extending collective agreements to non-federated companies by 
the Ministry of Labour (Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung) and the fair wages legislation. 
What about the future? Currently, in Germany, there is a continuing trend of 'hol-
lowing-out' of industry-level agreements by the organised and/or disorganised delega-
tion of collective bargaining authority from multi-employer to single-employer collec-
tive bargaining. As in the case of Britain, this may reduce the effectiveness of multi-
employer agreements. The impact of the increase in decentralised activities for the fu-
ture of multi-employer bargaining will mainly depend on whether the German unions, 
while suffering from continuing decline in membership, succeed in gaining control of 
workplace bargaining either from or via the works councils, and whether the govern-
ment continues to support (industry-level) collective bargaining. At the moment it ap-
pears as if the German system of union representation at the workplace level is strug-
gling with the challenges of collective bargaining decentralisation. 
For western Germany, the institutional embeddedness of the employment relation-
ship based on legal and political institutions still appears to be able to provide sufficient 
incentives for employers to remain within the multi-employer collective bargaining sys-
tem, while the multi-employer collective bargaining arrangements may be expected to 
further increase flexibility. For eastern Germany, however, the transfer of western Ger-
man institutions after unification appears not to have been effective. The transition 
process of the eastern German economy, the organisational problems of employers’ as-
sociations in organising eastern German companies, and the lack of tradition of operat-
ing within the western German institutional system may be among the various reasons.  
The current British collective bargaining system relies less on legal and political 
institutions, and thus does not enjoy the institutional embeddedness of the German 
system. Rather, it is based on the organisational strength of one industrial relations ac-
tor, namely the unions. Now that the decline of unions has come to a halt at the end 
of the 1990s in terms of membership, one may expect this to strengthen collective 
bargaining, at least of the single-employer type. The major obstacle to the resurgence 
or multi-employer bargaining in the private sector will be the organisational incapabil-
ity of the employers' associations in the absence of any political or institutional incen-
tives for employers. 
So, what will be the future of collective governance in Britain and Germany? Let 
us first turn to Britain. If the trend of union decline may be stopped permanently, or 
even be reversed, one may expect collective bargaining to stabilise at single-employer 
levels, with or without support of the new recognition procedure. The resurgence of 
multi-employer bargaining, however, seems unlikely. 
As far as Germany is concerned, the future of collective governance is very diffi-
cult to predict. So long as the collective bargaining system is institutionally embedded 
and backed by political support, multi-employer collective bargaining will persist, at 
least for western Germany. However, if the creeping decline of multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining gains momentum, the organisational weakness of the trade unions at 
workplace level may lead to the replacement of multi-employer collective bargaining, 
not by single-employer collective bargaining, but rather by individual regulation.  
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Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, the combination of a low degree of in-
stitutional embeddedness and a high degree of organisational embeddedness at the 
workplace level in Britain may be more conducive to collective governance structures 
in the long run than the combination of a high degree of institutional embeddedness 
and a low degree of organisational embeddedness at workplace level which exists in 
Germany. However, at the present time much of this argument is informed specula-
tion at best, and only time will tell the future of collective bargaining in Britain and 
Germany. 
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